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Abbas Ehsanfar, Student Member, IEEE, Babak Heydari, Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper introduces a new scheme for autonomous
electricity cooperatives, called predictive cooperative (PCP),
which aggregates commercial and residential electricity con-
sumers and participates in the electricity market on behalf of
its members. An axiomatic approach is proposed to calculate
the day-ahead bid and to disaggregate the collective cost among
participating consumers. The resulting formulation is shown
to keep the members incentivized to both participate in the
cooperative and remain truthful in reporting their expected loads.
The scheme is implemented using PJM (world’s largest wholesale
electricity market) real-time and day-ahead price data for 2015
and a collection of residential and commercial load profiles.
The model performance of this framework is compared to that
of real-time pricing (RTP) scheme, in which wholesale market
prices are directly applied to individual consumers. The results
show truthful load announcement by consumers, reduction in
electricity price variation for all consumers, and comparative
benefits for participants.
Index Terms—energy cooperatives, demand side management,
agent-based simulation, mechanism design, electricity price
I. INTRODUCTION
THE new paradigm of the electricity industry commonlyknown as smart grid includes active demand response
(DR), distributed energy resources (DER), enhanced asset
utilization, and consumer choice [1].
The integration of demand-side management (DSM) in the
future smart grid has been widely discussed in the literature,
e.g., [2], [3]. In general, demand response approaches can be
divided into three categories: autonomous demand response
and scheduling [4], [5]; price-based demand-side manage-
ment [6]; and a mixed approach that combines these two
schemes [7], [8] in order to provide the end-consumer with
simultaneous economic benefit and convenience in participa-
tion.
Price-based demand response applies variable pricing to
incentivize consumers to flatten their demand profile. Several
pricing schemes have been suggested in the literature including
time of use (TOU), critical peak pricing (CPP), and real-
time pricing (RTP) [3]. RTP schemes charge consumers hourly
prices that reflect the real cost of electricity in the wholesale
market [9], [10], [11]. Variations of this scheme have already
been introduced to commercial and residential consumers in
some regions such as ComEd’s residential real-time pricing
(RRTP) in the state of Illinois. Nevertheless, for residential
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consumers, RTP scheme has not been sufficiently effective
for demand response because of a number of economic and
behavioral issues, most notably low elasticity of residential
demand (especially at high prices) and difficulty of real-time
monitoring and inconvenience that residential consumers face
in prediction of prices [12], [13].
Automated enabling systems provide dynamic, active load
management that can respond to unforeseen real-time varia-
tions in the market [14]. Several benefits of intelligent au-
tonomous units in smart grid are discussed in details in [15],
[16], [17]. In the spirit of these benefits, some authors have
suggested combined use of real-time pricing with an auto-
mated framework in DR application: Conejo et al. and Parva-
nia et al. address DR with RTP and propose a solution for the
subsequent appliance scheduling optimization problem [18],
[4] ; Mohsenian et al. developed an RTP residential load
control for maximizing the consumer utility [10]; and Lujano
et al. propose a load management strategy that optimizes
negotiation between consumers and retailers with RTP [19]. In
practice, automated demand response relies on home energy
management systems (HEMS) to communicate with retailers,
and autonomous units of other consumers [20].
The majority of available RTP based models are developed
by assuming active participation of end-consumers in the
wholesale electricity market, an assumption that is unrealistic
from regulatory perspective in most regions [1]. Moreover, as
has been argued [10], [21], [22], a more effective practice
in demand-side management is to manage aggregate behavior
and incentivize demand response with price signals in a multi-
agent system, something that is not directly implementable
in a pure RTP scheme because real-time prices indiscrimi-
nately apply to all RTP consumers [23]. In principle, load
aggregation benefits consumers by offsetting the individual
load volatilities, thus decreasing relative load variations and
enhancing the accuracy of load prediction. However, in order
to benefit, consumers need to participate based on an internal
contractual scheme that clearly determines how aggregate
benefits or potential aggregate penalties shall be distributed
among participating consumers according to their level of
participation, truthfulness, load estimation, and external factors
such as market prices. Such cooperative schemes have been
previously introduced [24], [25], [5], however they need
to be formulated in such a way to incentivize participation
and truthful information sharing and disincentive free riding,
gaming, and detrimental opportunistic behavior.
In this spirit, the goal of this paper is to introduce a scheme
that flattens real-time price variations for participating con-
sumers in an electricity cooperative and incentivizes them to
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truthfully reveal their expected load information. This scheme
relies on an autonomous agent that interacts with consumers
and participates in the electricity market on their behalf.
The proposed scheme, called predictive cooperative (PCP),
includes four key components: load information sharing by
consumers, load aggregation and forecasting, day-ahead bid-
ding, and payment disaggregation. For each consumer, we
define two key parameters: an announced load as the expected
consumption and a confidence factor as a value between
0 and 1 that indicates, for the purpose of market bidding,
how much the consumer prefers to rely on PCP’s suggested
bid, as opposed to her own intended consumption. As the
first step, the PCP agent receives the load and confidence
factor for day-ahead loads from each HEMS unit. Then,
PCP forecasts the short-term aggregate load using double-
seasonal autoregressive smoothing method [26], which we
have modified to accommodate dynamic parameter updating.
The PCP then calculates the individual day-ahead bid using
the announced loads, confidence levels, and aggregate forecast.
Finally, the total cost will be disaggregated among consumers
according to an incentive-compatible formulation, developed
axiomatically.
There are two distinct advantages in combining PCP de-
mand forecasts with individual consumers’ estimates: First, the
sum of values provided by consumers is not necessarily the
accurate aggregate estimation and aggregate forecasting can
improve the estimation accuracy [27]. In addition, consumers
may be untruthful or biased in reporting their estimations for
energy usage [28], if market bids depend only on their reported
estimates.
Our paper makes the following contributions to the litera-
ture: First, it offers a novel incentive-compatible scheme for
electricity cooperatives to achieve a collective goal of reducing
price risk for the participants while enabling the prospect
of reduced average price for individual consumers, using a
bottom-up, axiomatic approach, which to the best of authors
knowledge have not been previously used in the literature
of smart grids. The paper furthermore mathematically proves
that the provided scheme is not only beneficial for indi-
vidual consumers to participate, but also provides incentives
to participants to adopt a truthful behavior when interacting
with the scheme. The combination of these two ensures a
bilateral trust between the cooperative scheme and individual
consumers. Finally, the paper uses an agent-based simulation,
using real-world data from the PJM1 market to demonstrate the
benefits of the proposed scheme. As a part of the simulation
process, and as a side contribution, the paper also improves
the accuracy of one of the standard short-term load forecasting
models by migrating toward dynamic parameter updating. Al-
though formulated for the PJM electricity market, the provided
scheme and the axiomatic method used in its development
can provide useful insights for formulating other cooperatives
of end-consumers in commodity markets with forward/future
contracts, such as agricultural water, natural gas and crops.
In the rest of this paper, we introduce the proposed frame-
1PJM electricity wholesale market coordinates and delivers power to whole
or part of 13 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia.
work and explain its various components. We first provide an
overview of the architecture of the framework in Section II,
then, in Section III we introduce an axiomatic approach for
effective day-ahead bids and disaggregation of the overall
payment into individual shares, followed by the load forecast-
ing model in Section IV. Finally, Section V-B presentes the
simulation of the proposed scheme and its performance, using
PJM market data.
II. INTERACTIVE ELECTRICITY COOPERATIVES
In this section, we introduce the concept of predictive
cooperative (PCP), a non-profit scheme that participates in
the wholesale market on behalf of its members on the one
hand, and acts as a contractual scheme for their participation
on the other hand. Residential and commercial electricity con-
sumers subscribe to the PCP, which provides consumers with
the day-ahead price, receives consumer information, forecasts
aggregated load, places an aggregate bid in the market, and
finally disaggregates the collective cost among consumers. An
overview of the proposed procedure is illustrated in Fig. 1 and
the following algorithm:
Algorithm I: PCP Daily Procedure.
1: I. 11am-12pm: Consumers provide their day-ahead expected load and
confidence factor.
2: II. 12pm: PCP forecasts load for the next-day time interval (12:00am-
11:59pm) and places bid in the day-ahead market.
3: III. 12am:
4: for each time step for 24 hours do
5: Participants consume their real-time load
6: PCP receives real-time prices from real-time market
7: PCP clears its account in real-time market
8: PCP charge the consumers with the disaggregated hourly payment
9: if 11am then
10: Repeat from step I for the next-day bids
11: end if
12: end for
Besides an accurate load prediction algorithm, as explained in
Section IV, the success of the PCP agent depends on two
critical components: First, since the load predicted by the
PCP agent is in general different from the sum of declared
day-ahead loads by individual consumers, the agent needs
to combine both of these signals in order to calculate the
effective day-ahead bid for each consumer. The relative weight
of each signal for a given consumer depends on the level
of confidence that the consumer has announced in the PCP
estimation versus her own. To combine these signals as a
function of the confidence factor, we propose an axiomatic
approach as explained in Section III-A.
The second issue arises because, even with a good effective
day-ahead bid model, real-time consumption have discrepancy
with respect to the effective day-ahead bid which translates
into potential costs or surpluses for the PCP and consequently
for individual consumers. Disaggregating these costs and sur-
pluses is a function of several parameters, such as day-ahead
bids, real-time consumption and market prices. Here again, we
use an axiomatic approach, as explained in Section III-B to
disaggregate the total payment for participating consumers as
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Fig. 1. The proposed PCP steps are: 1) PCP receives the day-ahead
load and confidence factor; 2) PCP places bid in day-ahead market; 3)
participants consume real-time load; 4) PCP receives real-time cost; and 5)
PCP disaggregates the cost among participants. The day-ahead model (Section.
(III-A)) is used for day-ahead market and the payment model (Section.(III-B))
is used for real-time market.
III. AXIOMATIC DAY-AHEAD AND PAYMENT
DISAGGREGATION MODELS
In this section we propose two models, one for the day-
ahead bid calculation and the other for final payment disag-
gregation among participants in an electricity cooperative. In
the first model, we use an axiomatic approach to formulate
how the PCP should calculate day-ahead bids by combining its
forecasted load - using a central forecasting algorithm as will
be explained in Section IV-with the sum of expected loads,
announced by individual consumers. The second model is used
to disaggregate the total payment among participants based on
a set of axioms inferred from mathematical constraints (fixed-
sum etc.) and fairness in payment model.
A. Day-Ahead Model
The PCP agent uses two distinct signals to calculate its
day-ahead bid: its own forecasted load (Lf(t)), and the sum
of announced day-ahead loads reported by the consumers to
the PCP (La(t) =
∑
i l
i
a(t)). We introduce total effective day-
ahead bid (Le) as the weighted combination of these two
signals. But how should the PCP agent decide about their
relative weights? To formulate this decision, we further assume
that each consumer has a certain level of confidence (ρi) to
the PCP agent. We model this confidence (ρi) as a number
between 0 (no confidence) and 1 (full confidence). Thus, the
PCP needs to take into account the confidence factors of
different consumers in order to combine the two signals that
make the effective day-ahead bid. To facilitate the calculations,
we introduce individual effective day-ahead bids(lie) as a set of
instrumental variables to capture individual consumers’ shares
of PCP day-ahead bid, so that Le =
∑
i l
i
e. To formulate the
value of lies, we take on an axiomatic approach by assuming
the following axioms:
1) Boundedness: : The total effective day-ahead bid is
bounded by the PCP forecasted load and the sum of indi-
viduals’ declared loads:
∃α ∈ [0, 1] : Le(t) = αLf(t) + (1 − α)La(t) (1)
where Le(t) is the aggregate day-ahead bid.
2) Similarity in deviation direction: : For all the day-ahead
loads, we assume that if the total effective bid is more(less)
than the sum of reported loads, then effective individual bid is
also more (less) than the individual reported load.This makes
sense since, depending on the confidence factor of a given
consumer, her effective bid is always between her reported bid
and a number calculated by the PCP, and the direction of this
deviation depends on the aggregate deviation. In other words
deviation of effective bids shall have the same sign as the
aggregate deviation: sign(li
e(t)− l
i
a(t)) = sign(Le(t)−La(t)).
3) Proportionality: : All other factors equal, effective bid
deviation of a consumer is an increasing function with respect
to her confidence factor: ∂(li
e(t) − l
i
a(t))/∂ρi(t) > 0. We now
need an equation for day-ahead bid that satisfies all these
axioms. The formulation is not unique, yet we pick the
following equation, which is simple and, as we will show,
satisfies all three axioms:
lie(t) = l
i
a(t) + ρ
2
i ∗ l
i
a(t) ∗ (Lf(t) − La(t))/
N∑
j=1
ρj l
j
a(t). (2)
And the total day-ahead bid is: Le(t) =
∑
i l
i
e(t).
Proposition 1. Equation (2) satisfies Axioms A.1- A.3.
Proof: First, the Le(t) will remain in the reasonable
boundary defined by Lf(t) and La(t). According to (1) we can
find α equal to: α = ρ2i ∗ lia(t)/
∑N
j=1 ρjl
j
a(t) which is in [0, 1]
because ρi ∈ [0, 1]. Second, lie(t)− lia(t) and Le(t)−La(t) have
identical signs because ρ2i ∗ lia(t) and
∑N
j=1 ρj l
j
a(t) are both
positive. Finally, the formulation ensures positive derivatives
for effective load deviation with respect to confidence level
(ρi):
∂(lie − l
i
a(t))
∂ρi
=
ρil
i
a(t)∗(2
∑N
j=1 ρil
j
a(t)
−ρil
i
a(t))
(
∑N
j=1 ρil
j
a(t)
)2
=
ρil
i
a(t)(2
∑
j={1,..,N}/i ρil
j
a(t)
+ρil
i
a(t))
(
∑
N
j=1 ρil
j
a(t)
)2
> 0.
B. Payment-Disaggregation Model
In real-time market, the total payment paid by the PCP is
a function of the effective day-ahead load, calculated in the
previous section, total real-time load and market prices. In
PJM market, this payment is calculated using the following
formulation [29]:
P(t) = Le(t) ∗ pd(t) + (Lr(t) − Le(t)) ∗ pr(t) (3)
where Lr(t) =
∑
i l
i
r(t) is the aggregate real-time load con-
sumption as a sum of individual consumptions, pd(t) and pr(t)
are respectively day-ahead and real-time prices2 and Le(t) is
the total effective day-ahead load as calculated by the PCP in
the previous section. We note that in the PJM formulation there
is no penalty for real-time load imbalance, but this doesn’t
change the generality of the formulation.
2Without loss of generality, we assume that all the prices are positive.
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Once the total payment is known, the PCP has to dis-
aggregate it for the share of each participating consumer.
Since we assume that the PCP is a non-for-profit scheme,
we expect the sum of these payments to be equal to the
total payment made by the PCP to the market. It is also
fair to assume that individual payments must be increasing
functions of individual consumptions. Moreover, we expect
the payment disaggregation scheme to be aligned with the
overall incentive goals of the cooperative, that is encouraging
participants to either minimize their deviations or to time-
shift their loads to lower total daily payments made by the
PCP. To create this incentive structure, PCP divides consumers
into two groups: The first group (deviation reducers) are those
who have helped with lowering the total deviation, to whom
the PCP offers a potential reward by giving them a price
choice between day-ahead and real-time prices. This incentive
is in general costly for the PCP and its cost is assumed to
be shouldered by the second group (deviation contributors)
who have contributed to the total deviation. These constraints
and incentive mechanisms are captured more clearly in the
following axioms:
1) Balanced Payment: : In a non-profit cooperative, sum
of all payments made by consumers must be equal to what
the PCP pays to the market, i.e.,
∑N
i=1 P
i
(t) = P(t).
2) Positive Marginal Price: : As long as the direction
of imbalance remains unchanged, i.e., the sign of ∆(t) =
Lr(t) − Le(t) remains unchanged, each consumer’s payment
is an increasing function of her load. i.e. ∂(P it )/∂(lir(t)) > 0.
3) Deviation Incentive: : The first group of consumers,
those who have not contributed to the aggregate load deviation,
will be given a choice to pick the price (pr(t) vs pd(t)) by which
their deviation payment is calculated. This deviation payment
can in general be positive or negative.
In order to formulate deviation incentives, as well as devia-
tion responsibility in Axiom 4, we define four deviation cases
for each individual as follows: case1 : ∆ > 0 and δi >
0, case2 : ∆ < 0 and δ
i < 0, case3 : ∆ > 0 and δ
i <
0, case4 : ∆ < 0 and δ
i > 0. Where ∆ was defined earlier
and δi(t) = lir(t) − lie(t) for each consumer. Cases 3 and 4
represent deviation reducers while cases 1 and 2 represent
deviation contributors.
Assuming all consumers are rational, and assuming individ-
ual payments are calculated using similar formulation as in
(3), this axiom results in the following payments for deviation
reducer consumers:
P i =
{
lie ∗ pd + (l
i
r − l
i
e) ∗max{pd, pr}for case3
lie ∗ pd + (l
i
r − l
i
e) ∗min{pd, pr} for case4
(4)
4) Deviation Responsibility: : This axiom is complimentary
to the previous axiom, and states that deviation contributors
shall be responsible for potential additional costs, posed on
PCP, because of the incentives given to deviation reducers as
stated under Axiom B.3.
We now need to formulate individual payments that satisfy
these four axioms. As the first step, we distinguish between
scenarios depending on the direction of price change from
day-ahead to real-time. We consider subscripted letters a and
b for pr ≥ pd and pd < pr, respectively. For instance case1a
combines the three conditions of ∆Lt > 0 , ∆Lit > 0, and
pr ≥ pd.
When ∆ > 0 and pr > pd (case1a, case3a) or ∆ < 0 and
pr < pd (case2b, case4b), incentives for deviation reducers,
as stated in Axiom B.3, does not add additional cost to the
cooperative (price choice is the real-time price in these cases),
thus the deviation payment of all consumers can be calculated
using pr and the individual payment for each consumer,
regardless of the case they belong to, is calculated as follows:
P i = lie ∗ pd + (l
i
r − l
i
e) ∗ pr (5)
For such cases, the above equation satisfies all four ax-
ioms by definition. However, when ∆ > 0 and pr < pd
(case1b, case3b) or ∆ < 0 and pr > pd (case2a, case4a),
payment calculations need to be formulated differently to
satisfy Axioms B1-B4 since deviation reducers use day-ahead
prices in the choice they are given as stated in Axiom B.3,
which in turn result in additional cost for the PCP. This cost,
as mentioned earlier, should be paid by deviation contributors.
Similar to the effective day-ahead load model, the formula-
tion for individual payments here is not unique. We construct
individual payments as follows and will later show that it
satisfies all the axioms:
P i(t) = l
i
r(t) ∗ pd(t) +∆ ∗ (pr(t) − pd(t)) ∗
δi∑
j∈S δ
j
(6)
where S indicates the set of all deviation contributors and an
additional cost is added to their payment, proportional to their
share of total deviation.
Proposition 2. The payment model satisfies Axioms B.1- B.4.
Proof: First, it’s easy to show that the formulation is
balanced (Axiom B.1) and the sum of individual payments is
equal to (3). In the cases when (5) applies, payments naturally
add up to (3). However, for cases where (6) applies, we have:
P =
∑
i∈N l
i
r ∗ pd + ∆ ∗ (pr − pd) ∗
∑
i∈S δ
i/
∑
j∈S δ
j =
(ld +∆) ∗ pd +∆ ∗ (pr − pd) = Ld ∗ pd +∆ ∗ pr.
Second, the proposed formulation is increasing with respect
to the individual load, given the total balance and price
direction (Axiom B.2). For cases where (5) applies, this is
satisfied by definition. For those cases who use (6), for the
sake of simplicity we put:
f =
δi ∗
∑N
j=1 δ
j∑
j∈S δ
j
=
(x− c)(x + α)
(x+ β)
when x = lir, c = lie, α < β and x > c (since the denominator
is the sum of only positive deltas). Then, we prove that the
first derivative of the payment function is strictly positive:
df/dx = (x2 + 2βx+ αβ − cβ + cα)/(x2 + 2βx+ β2)
since αβ−cβ+cα < αβ−cβ+cβ = αβ < β2 then df/dx <
1 and since dP i(t)/dx = pD(t) + (pR(t) − pD(t)) ∗ df/dx and
pR(t) ≥ 0 then dP i(t)/dx > 0. Similar logic applies to the case
with δi < 0.
Finally, (6) ensures deviation responsibility for case1 and
case2 and (4) ensures the consumer’s choice for case3 and
case4 (Axioms B. 3 and B.4).
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C. Incentive Compatibility
In this section, we first show that, given the suggested
scheme, participants behave truthfully in reporting their ex-
pected consumptions, thus the PCP can trust consumers. Then,
and as a key result of this paper, we show that consumers
are in general better off if they join a PCP, compared to a
hypothetical scenario in which they directly participate in the
market.
Proposition 3. In the proposed scheme, if a consumer as-
sumes that the aggregate load is unbiased, regardless of the
distribution of confidence for other consumers, being truthful
about the expected load is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: We first prove a lemma that states that the effec-
tive bid, equal to expected real-time demand, minimizes the
expected price; then show that truthful load provided by each
consumer ensures the optimal expected bid (equal to expected
demand).
lemma. Assuming normal distribution for real-time prices,
with expected value equal to the day-ahead price (E[pr] =
pd)3, if the total day-ahead load estimation is unbiased
(E[∆] = 0) accurate effective bid in the day-ahead market
(lie = lir) results in a minimum expected electricity price for
the consumer (see Appendix A).
From the above lemma, the accurate effective bid (equal to
the expected real-time load) yields the least expected price.
Accordingly, we set the day-ahead load in (2) equal to lr:
lie − l
i
r = l
i
a − l
i
r +
ρ2i l
i
a(Lf −
∑
j∈N l
j
a)∑
j∈N ρj l
j
a
(7)
and for the expected value we have:
E
[
lia − l
i
r +
ρ2i l
i
a(Lf−
∑
j∈N l
j
a)
∑
j∈N ρj l
j
a
]
= lia − E[lr] + E
[
ρ2i l
i
a(Lf−
∑
j∈N l
j
a)
∑
j∈N ρj l
j
a
]
In the last term of the above equation, lets assume that
we can define positive upper and lower boundary for the
denominator corresponding to lia: B1 <
∑
j∈N ρj l
j
a < B2.
For the lower boundary, if lia → E[lr]−, we have:
E[lie − l
i
r]> fL(l
i
a) = l
i
a − E[lr] +
E[ρ2i l
i
a(Lf−
∑
j∈N l
i
a)]
B2
= lia − E[lr] +
ρ2i l
i
a(E[Lf−
∑
j∈N\i l
j
a]−l
i
a)
B2
because other consumers and the PCP are assumed to be
truthful and unbiased, we have:
E[Lf −
∑
j∈N\i
lja] = E[lr]
if we set lia = E[lr], the RHS of the inequality approaches
zero: limlia→E[lr]− fL(l
i
a) = 0. In addition, B1 results in an
upper boundary:
fU (l
i
a) = l
i
a − E[lr] +
ρ2i l
i
a(E[lr]− l
i
a)
B1
3 This assumption is in accordance with PJM market price distribution.
where limlia→E[lr ]− fU (l
i
a) = 0. Since both upper and lower
boundary approach zero for lia → E[lr]−, using a similar logic
these boundary approach zero for lia → E[lr]+. We can then
conclude:
lim
lia→E[lr]
E[lie − l
i
r] = 0
which indicates that condition to other consumers being truth-
ful, no single consumer has incentive to change her truthful
strategy, thus being truthful is a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4. For a given consumer, if PCP is unbiased
with respect to aggregate load estimation, relying on PCP’s
effective bid is a (weakly) dominant strategy. (see Appendix B)
IV. SHORT TERM LOAD FORECASTING
The PCP uses a variation of double seasonal autoregressive
exponential smoothing (DSAES) for forecasting aggregated
load [26], [30]. The original formulation is taken from [31]
as:
Lˆf(t+ k) = bt + dt−s1−k1 + wt−s2+k2 + φ
ket (8)
where Lˆf(t + k) is the load forecast for the next k steps
of current time interval t, s1 and s2 are the number of time
intervals in a day and week (24 and 168 respectively), bt is
the smoothed level, dt and wt are the seasonal index for daily
and weekly cycles, k1 = [(k − 1) mod s1] + 1 and k2 =
[(k − 1) mod s2] + 1, and k is forecasting lead time. The
term involving φ is the autoregressive adjustment for first-
order residual autocorrelation.
Fig. 2. Dynamic load forecasting model
(opt: optimize)
A critical step in this
model is to initialize the
three main model param-
eters for daily, weekly
and autoregressive adjust-
ments. The initialization
method introduced in [30]
uses 105 random initial
points for each model pa-
rameter as well as the
Newton method for root
estimation.
This model however has
two practical problems for
autonomous systems: First,
the level of sensitivity
of the prediction accuracy
to these parameters makes
static parameter estimation less appealing. Moreover, the ini-
tialization algorithm is rather computationally intensive and
demands disproportionate computational resources. Instead,
we modified the model using a dynamic algorithm that cal-
culates forecasting model parameters once a day to predict
the 36 hours of load time series. Note that the day-ahead bid
includes all the expected values of 24 consecutive hours of next
day load, which is in accordance with the day-ahead market
functionality. Then, using 12- to 36-hour load forecasting, PCP
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TABLE I
MAPE MEASURE OF DSAES METHOD WITH FIXED AND DYNAMIC
PARAMETERS
Lead Hours Dynamic Parameters Fixed Parameters
12 0.0474 0.0552
24 0.0424 0.0468
36 0.0497 0.0541
can submit the day-ahead bid at 6PM of the day before the
transaction4(see Fig. 2).
This model was implemented in Python on a sample con-
sumers load data [32]. The results show 9%-15% reduction in
forecasting error, an improvement that is the result of using
dynamic parameter updating, in comparison with the more
conventional static parameter methods (Table I).
V. SIMULATION
In this section, we first provide some illustrative compu-
tational results for the axiomatic models developed in Sec-
tion III. We the provide a simulated model of the proposed
scheme, using real-world market data.
A. Numerical Illustration
Fig. 3 shows the results for individual unit price as a func-
tion of individual load deviation as presented in Section III-B.
Each figure illustrates the price sensitivity to load deviation for
four scenarios of real-time price deviation (RPD) where (∆)
represents the aggregate load deviation. The relative price is
decreasing as a function of real-time load when the aggregate
load is negative, although the marginal price is increasing (see
Fig. 3a). The opposite case holds for the positive aggregate
load deviation (see Fig. 3d). In the case with zero aggregate
deviation, we can see that the optimum price pertains to zero
individual deviation (see Fig. 3b). Finally, if the individual
deviation can offset the aggregate deviation, one can observe a
discontinuous price because the consumer switches from being
a deviation reducer to a deviation contributor (see Fig. 3c).
In Fig. 4a, we show the results for the electricity unit
price as a function of individual load deviation (day-ahead
bid minus the expected real-time load). In this figure, the
optimum level of deviation is very close to zero for different
levels of MAPE. However, we can see a shift toward right
for higher levels of estimation error. The reason is a higher
price sensitivity to lower values in denominator, i.e., the
real-time load. Fig. 4b shows the expected price versus the
individual deviation when the expected total deviation (E[∆])
varies. The expected price is higher for higher deviation when
there is negligible aggregate deviation. However, the expected
price decreases if a consumer’s load deviation is against the
aggregate load deviation. For instance, a consumer benefits if
its load deviation is positive while the aggregate deviation is
4The complexity of the second approach is reduced from O(T ∗ 1015 ∗
F (n)) (for each data point) to O(T ∗1010 ∗F (n)/7) when T is the number
of historical time steps used (672 for 4 weeks) and F(n) is the complexity of
Newton method for n refers to digit precision. The computational intensiveness
is however not a major problem in the proposed PCP as it is calculated only
once a day.
Fig. 3. Relative price deviation vs load deviation and real-time price
deviation(RPD): (a) aggregate balance is negative and |∆| is significantly
larger than |δ|, (b) aggregate balance is close to zero, (c) aggregate balance
is positive and |∆| is comparable to |δ|, (d) aggregate balance is positive and
|∆| is significantly larger than |δ|, (∆:aggregate deviation, δ: individual load
deviation).
negative and vice versa. This results are in agreement with
the results shown in Fig. 3. This opportunity ensures that any
consumer with knowledge of aggregate bias may modify her
expected load to the PCP, which in turn reduces the aggregate
deviation. This phenomena can be considered as a negative
feedback loop between the expected aggregate bias and the
individual bias.
B. Agent-Based Simulation
We study the performance of the PCP using real-world
electricity day-ahead and real-time prices and the realistic
load profiles in an agent-based model. We collect a sample
repository of simulated load profiles according to the PJM
geographic area [32]. To benchmark the proposed schemes,
we compare the simulation results with real-time pricing
(RTP) scheme. In RTP, each consumer places a bid in the
day-ahead market and the payment is calculated using her
effective bid, real-time consumption, and market prices similar
to (3). Simulations, including all the models for the PCP and
consumers are developed using Object-Oriented Python.
The model inputs include the trading time frame (T ),
the number of consumers (N ), hourly load profile for each
consumer (Li), market day-ahead prices (Pd), market real-
time prices (Pr), and the number of simulation rounds (M ).
The estimated load and the confidence factors are calculated
and announced by each consumer agent. The latter is assigned
using a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 and is updated by
each consumer based on the cooperative’s historical advantage
to her. The model output include the list of relative prices
(ppcp/pd or prtp/pd) for each set of consumers with similar
level of MAPE.
The trading time frame is set to 3600 hourly time intervals
for Feb-July 2015 and we consider the same set of consumers
(one hundred) for PCP and RTP schemes. To represent a
consumer’s load estimation error, we use MAPE measure
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Fig. 4. Electricity unit price vs the effective bid deviation and real-time load
deviation: a) the expected relative price versus the bid deviation with unbiased
cooperative, b) the expected relative price vs real-time deviation with biased
cooperative.
that evenly varies between 0.02 and 0.20. The MAPE of our
aggregate forecasting model, presented in Section IV, is less
than 0.05 in this model. To diminish the effect of a single
load profile (rather than MAPE) on the outcome, we consider
50-round simulations with random MAPE assignments to
consumers. For each consumer, we assume that the confidence
factor (ρi) is a random value between 0 and 1 in the first
iteration, drawn from a uniform distribution. For the purpose
of this simulation, we further assume that each confidence
factor is updated to the average of its previous value and
1(0) in case the PCP average price is lower(higher) than RTP
average price during the last 24 hours. Fig. 5c shows the
evolution of confidence factor (average ρ¯ for all consumers and
ρi for consumers with different MAPE levels). The average
confidence factor converges to lower values for consumers
with higher MAPE, mainly because they are more likely
to be a deviation contributor. The statistical measures for
each data point are generated using a set of 1.8e6 calculated
relative prices5. The statistical measures include relative price
median, standard deviation and various percentiles of each
set of sample points. To better represent the overall trend, in
Fig. 5, we don’t show all of the data points.
5Includes the 50 rounds of simulations on 3600 time steps.
The first simulation is aimed at determining the effect of
load forecasting error on consumer’s relative price and relative
price standard deviation. Fig. 5 shows the results for unit price
distribution. In all figures, the x-axis shows the MAPE and
the price variation is expectedly increasing corresponding to
the forecasting error. Fig. 5a compares the price percentiles
between PCP and RTP. The median relative price is equal
to one for all consumers because expected values of real-
time and day-ahead prices are very close to each other in the
PJM market. In PCP, the price distribution is skewed toward
lower prices because, assuming an unbiased load forecasting
and price distribution and positive deviation, the lower values
of pr and pd statistically apply to 25% of the cases. Also,
pr applies to other 50% of cases and a finally quarter of
the prices remain between the two values (50% higher and
50% lower than pd). So, less than half of the relative prices
can stay higher than the median price and this is why the
distributions are skewed toward the lower prices. Note that
same logic can be applied to negative deviation, however,
this logic only applies to consumers whose deviation cannot
offset the aggregate deviation. For higher levels of MAPE, the
distribution approaches a normal distribution with mean value
equal to one.
VI. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In electricity wholesale markets, day-ahead prices offer
clear incentives to consumers for flattening their load-profiles.
However, risks associated with price volatilities in real-time
market, among other things, discourage consumers from ac-
tive participation in the electricity market. Any autonomous
scheme that offers consumers lower risk associated with real-
time price volatility can incentivize active demand-side man-
agement based on market prices. In this paper, we introduced
an autonomous cooperative agent that applies load forecasting
along with axiomatic day-ahead bid and payment sharing
model for the electricity wholesale markets. We contributed
to (i) axiomatic models for day-ahead bid calculation and cost
sharing and (ii) a dynamic coefficient updating in a competitive
forecasting technique.
The paper offers a novel incentive-compatible scheme for
electricity cooperatives to achieve a collective goal of reducing
price risk for the participants while enabling the prospect
of reduced average price for individual consumers, using a
bottom-up, axiomatic approach. It is mathematically proven
that the provided scheme is not only beneficial for individual
consumers to participate in, but also provides incentives to
participants to adopt a truthful behavior when interacting
with the scheme. Using agent-based simulation, we tested the
proposed scheme with real-world data of PJM markets and
realistic consumer load profiles. The results demonstrate that
the PCP scheme, compared to a hypothetical RTP scheme
-in which individual consumers interact directly with the
market - reduces electricity price variations for all consumers.
In addition to being truthful to PCP about their estimated
load, consumers are incentivized to decrease their estimation
variance since higher estimation accuracy leads to higher
confidence factor and lower prices.
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Fig. 5. Simulation results for the electricity price as a function of the load estimation error (MAPE): (a) Relative unit price (the final price divided by
the day-ahead price) percentiles and (b) Relative price standard deviation (normalized standard deviation with the day-ahead price) for RTP and PCP. The
agent-based simulation includes 100 consumers, (c) confidence factor evolution in multi-agent simulation.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THE LEMMA III-C
Let’s assume the following probabilities for a specific time
interval t: ρ = P [pr > pd], ω = P [Lr > Le], and θ = P [lir >
lie] for the consumer i. According to the partition theory, the
expected payment by the consumer is (for simplicity, we avoid
repetitive t and show case with letter c):
E[Pi
lr
] = ρωθE[ lepd+δ
ipr
lr
|c1a]
+ ρω(1− θ)E[ lepd+δ
ipr
lr
|c2a] + ρ(1− ω)θE[pd|c3a]
+ ρ(1− ω)(1− θ)E[pd +
δi∆(pr−pd)
∆S− lr
|c4a]
+ (1− ρ)ωθE[pd +
δi∆(pr−pd)
∆S+ lr
|c1b]
+ (1− ρ)ω(1− θ)E[pd|c2b]
+ (1− ρ)(1 − ω)θE[ lepd+δ
ipr
lr
|c3b]
+ (1 − ρ)(1− ω)(1− θ)E[ lepd+δ
ipr
lr
|c4b] (9)
This can be combined to much simpler expression. As the
result, the equation equals to:
E[Pi
lr
] = Kpd + ρωE[
le
lr
]E[pd − pr|pr > pd]
+ (1− ρ)(1− ω)E[ le
lr
]E[pd − pr|pr < pd]
+ ρ(1− ω)(1− θ)E[ δ
i∆
∆S− lr
|case1]E[pr − pd|pr < pd]
+ (1 − ρ)ωθE[ δ
i∆
∆S+ lr
|case4]E[pr − pd|pr > pd]
In the last expression, K is a constant, the pr has normal
distribution with the mean pd, then ρ = 0.5. Also, the expected
value of ∆ is assumed to be zero by consumers, so ω = 0.5.
Also we have:
E[pd − pr|pr > pd] = −E[pd − pr|pr < pd]
We simplify the final formulation accordingly as:
E [Pi
lr
] = pd + 0.25αθE[
δi∆
∆S+ lr
|lr > le,∆ > 0]
− 0.25α(1− θ)E[ δi∆
∆S− lr
|lr < le,∆ < 0] (10)
when α = E[pr − pd|pr > pd] > 0. Also by definition
E[ δ
i∆
∆S+ lr
|lr > le,∆ > 0] is a positive number (∆S+ > 0)
and E[ δ
i
lr
|lr < le] is negative (∆S− < 0); this ensures that
E[Pi
lr
] ≥ pd and day-ahead bid equal to real-time consumption
ensures the lowest expected price equal to pd.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THE PROPOSITION 4
In the cases when other consumers are biased in their
estimation while the PCP is not biased, according to (2)
the positive estimation bias by other consumers will reduce
the expected value of day-ahead load by consumer i, also a
negative estimation bias will increase the expected value of
day-ahead bid. In other words, E[∆] > 0 leads to E[δ] < 0
and vice versa if the consumer has been truthful with its
estimation.
Also, based on (10) the final expected price is combination
of first part, with expected value of pd and the second part,
including positive values. Lets assume that the ω = P [∆ >
0] > 0.5, then the most influential term in the equation will
be:
ωθE[
δi∆
∆S+ lr
|lr > le,∆ > 0]
and since ω is already increased, we can reduce the coefficient
ω ∗ θ by reducing the probability of positive load deviation
P [δi > 0] = θ. Since this effect holds for any E[∆] > 0
with a symmetric distribution, any individual deviation that
balances the aggregate deviation can reduce the expected
price. The same logic holds for cases with E[∆] < 0 or
ω = P [∆ > 0] < 0.5 when reducing the aggregate deviation
benefits the individual consumer. In simulations, this effect can
further reduce the final price to p < pd, as it is illustrated in
Fig. 4b.
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